Abstract
I. Introduction
The relationship between financial intermediation and economic growth has attracted much attention of economists since a long time, particularly since the emergence of the new theories of endogenous economic growth. Although different economists attach different degrees of importance to financial intermediation, its role in economic growth can be theoretically postulated and has been supported by more and more empirical evidence.
Theoretically, financial intermediation, by reducing information and transaction costs, can affect economic growth through two channels: (i) productivity; and (ii) capital formation. With regard to the first channel, it is generally argued that financial intermediaries, by facilitating risk management, identifying promising projects, monitoring management, and facilitating the exchange of goods and services, can promote efficient capital allocation leading to a total factor productivity improvement (Levine, 1997) . For example, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) shows that financial intermediation provides a vehicle for diversifying and sharing risks, inducing capital allocation shift toward risky but "high expected return" projects. This shift then spurs productivity improvement and economic growth. Bencivenga and Smith (1991) argues that financial intermediaries, by pooling the idiosyncratic liquidity risks, channel households' financial savings into illiquid but high-return projects and avoid the premature liquidation of profitable investments, which favors efficient use of capital and promotes economic growth. However, the impact of financial intermediation on growth through the second channel-capital formation-is ambiguous. Financial intermediation may raise or reduce the savings rate.
Most of the empirical research based on cross-country data suggests a positive relationship between financial intermediation and economic growth. King and Levine (1993) identifies a positive correlation between the level of a country's financial intermediation and the growth rate of its real per capita GDP. However, the relevance of its finding is compromised by the problematic issue of causality and the potential bias arising from the joint determination of financial development and growth. Levine (1998 Levine ( , 1999 improve upon King and Levine (1993) , by using legal factors as
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Proceedings of the 15 th Annual Conference of the Association for Chinese Economics Australia (ACESA) instrumental variables for financial intermediation indicators to control for simultaneity bias, and find that the exogenous component of banking development is positively correlated with per capita income growth, productivity improvement and capital accumulation. Furthermore, Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) and Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000) apply recent GMM techniques developed for dynamic panels, and provide more evidence that the development of financial intermediation has a strong and causal effect on economic growth.
Since the beginning of economic reform in 1978, China's performance in economic growth and the financial sector expansion has been impressive. Over the period 1978-2001, the Chinese economy saw an annual growth rate of 9.4% in real terms, while loans outstanding relative to GDP increased from 51.1% to 117.1% (China Statistical Yearbook, various years) 2 . It appears that fast economic growth and development of financial intermediation go hand in hand. Is this phenomenon only coincidental, or does it confirm the conclusion of numerous theoretical and empirical research papers that financial development plays an important role in fostering economic growth?
Unfortunately, although a lot of studies have been done searching for the explanations of China's economic miracle, few has considered financial development as a potential determinant of such miraculous growth. Furthermore, most case studies of financegrowth nexus about China use traditional "loan-to-GDP ratio"-type indicators to measure the development of financial intermediation, and fail to detect a positive relationship between finance and growth 3 . This paper shows that for Chinese economy the loan-to-GDP ratio reflects only one aspect of the development of financial intermediation, and may be the least possible channel through which the development of financial intermediation affects economic growth. There exist however two other channels-the substitution of loans for state budget appropriation and the mobilization of households savings-through which the development of financial intermediation spurs China's economic growth. Furthermore, this paper uses Financial Statistics: 1952 . Therefore, at that time, China's economy didn't need a sophisticated financial system to channel the households' surplus income into productive investments. The economic reform-begun in 1978-has resulted in a material change in the national income distribution through the liberation of prices, the rapid development of non-state enterprises and the granting of greater autonomy to SOEs (Zhang, 1999) . First, as a result of the liberation of prices, agricultural products' prices increased sharply, which raised the rural households' earning, and also raised the input costs of the SOEs-dominated industry and consequently eroded the profit base of SOEs. Second, the emergence and rapid expansion of the non-state sector intensified competition on the product and factor markets, which broke the SOEs' monopoly, reduced their profit margins and raised the labor remuneration. In conclusion, the development of financial intermediation in China have three main aspects: (i) loan expansion; (ii) the mobilization of households savings; and (iii) the substitution of loans for state budget appropriation as the primary source of external funding.
In the following, we analyze respectively the impact on growth of these three aspects.
China's bank-dominated financial sector is famous for its inefficiency and misallocation of capital. Its distribution of loans, both between state and non-state sector and among provinces, is far from rational based on purely economic considerations.
The state sector, while contributing less and less to economic growth, continues to absorb a disproportionately large share of bank loans. Under the government's pressure, most household savings are channeled by financial intermediaries, particularly the four state-owned banks, into the inefficient state sector, even into lossmaking SOEs. On the other hand, the non-state sector, being perceived as the more efficient and dynamic sector, has extremely limited access to debt finance. Therefore, the efficiency of loans is questionable. Loan expansion may not be an effective channel through which the development of financial intermediation can promote economic growth.
However, although loan distribution is not totally efficient according to purely commercial considerations, loans are generally considered a more efficient means than state budget appropriation for allocating financial resources. Unlike budget appropriation, loans call for payments of interest and principals. So they help to harden enterprises' budget constraint, and may promote more efficient use of capitals.
Moreover, bank employees have more incentives to allocate financial resources toward profitable projects than government bureaucrats, because bank employee compensation is linked to the quality of lending portfolio and the main consideration of government bureaucrats consists in social stability (Cull and Xu, 2003) .
Empirically, Liu and Li (2001) finds a significant relationship between output growth and financial sources of fixed asset investments: compared to state appropriation, domestic loans are used more efficiently and have a larger impact on output growth. Furthermore, the impact of the development of financial intermediation on economic growth may also run through the mobilization of households financial savings.
First, McKinnon (1973) argues that, when all economic units are confined to selffinance, money balance have to be accumulated before costly and indivisible investment projects can be undertaken, and so money and physical capital are complements. This argument seems to be applicable to China. Chinese non-state enterprises and households have actually extremely limited access to bank loans.
In addition, in China there exist effective informal financing channels that convert households savings into productive investments of non-state enterprises. The nonstate sector is more efficient than state sector and constitutes effectively China's growth engine. So the mobilization of households savings may favor economic growth and productivity amelioration through supporting non-state sector's investments.
In summary, since the beginning of economic reform, China's financial intermediation took off and became an essential means of resources allocation.
Financial intermediaries channel more and more household savings into productive investment. The distribution of loans may be far from socially optimal. But loans are more efficient than state budgetary appropriation for allocating financial resources.
The substitution of loans for state budgetary appropriation may improve the efficiency of capital use. So we argue that, in the specific context of Chinese economy, the development of financial intermediation may favor economic growth through the mobilization of households savings and the substitution of loans for state budget appropriation, but may not through loan expansion.
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III. Financial Intermediation and Growth: Evidence from China's Provincial Data
To empirically assess the impact of the development of financial intermediation on China's economic growth, this study uses provincial data for the following reasons:
1. Both the level of economic and financial development vary so obviously among provinces that provincial data may contain interesting information that can be exploited.
2.
Boyreau-Debray (2003) argues that the degree of interprovincial capital mobility is low in China, which makes the analysis of local financial intermediation's impact on local economic growth meaningful.
3.
The time series of many financial variables at the national level are not long enough to allow econometric analysis. The use of provincial data not only increases our choices of financial variables, but also expands the sample size significantly.
In the following of this section, we introduce at first the first-differenced GMM estimator developed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and the GMM-System estimator suggested by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . Then we construct a set of indicators to measure the development of financial intermediation, describe the data, present our model, and finally show the main results.
A. Methodology
Let us consider the following growth equation:
where Y is the logarithm of real per capita GDP, X is the set of explanatory variables, η is the time invariant individual-specific effect, ε is the error term, with the subscripts i and t representing an individual and time, respectively. In estimating equation 1, we are often confronted with two mains econometric issues.
The first one results from the introduction of both a lagged dependent variable and an unobserved time invariant individual-specific effects in the equation. Hsiao (1986) shows that omitting the individual fixed effects in a dynamic panel data model will render the ordinary least squares (OLS) levels estimates biased and inconsistent. For example, the likely positive correlation between lagged dependent variable Y i,t-1 and omitted fixed effects η i can make the coefficient estimate by OLS biased upwards.
On the other hand, Nickell (1981) To address these problems, Arellano and Bond (1991) proposes the first-differenced GMM estimator. It consists in eliminating the time invariant individual-specific effects η i by taking the first difference of equation 1. Doing that we obtain
By construction, (Y i,t-1 -Y i,t-2 ) and (ε i,t -ε i,t-1 ) are correlated. OLS estimation of equation 2 will not give an unbiased and consistent estimate of β. Hence, we must find valid instruments for (Y i,t-1 -Y i,t-2 ).
Assuming that (a) the error terms are not serially correlated, However, Blundell and Bond (1998) argues that when the lagged dependent and the explanatory variables are persistent over time, lagged values of these variables are only weak instruments for the first-differenced equation. And the first-differenced GMM estimator is expected to have a large finite sample bias and poor precision in simulation studies. Blundell and Bond (2000) confirms this statement by showing that in the case of weak instruments, the first-differenced GMM estimator will be biased towards the Within groups estimator. To reduce the potential biases and imprecision, Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) suggest estimating a system that combines the set of equations in first-differences (equation 2) with the additional set of equations in levels (equation 1). For the regression in differences, the instruments are the same as above. For the regression in levels, the instruments are the suitably lagged differences of corresponding variables. Assuming that (a) the The consistency of the GMM-System estimator depends on the validity of the assumption of no serial correlation of the error term, and on the validity of the instruments, This can be tested by two specification tests proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) , Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) . One is a
Sargen test of over-identifying restrictions, which can test the overall validity of the instruments. Another is the m 2 statistic, which tests the presence of second-order serial correlation in the first-differenced error term. Failure to reject the null hypotheses of both tests provides evidence to suggest that the no serial correlation assumption and the instruments are valid.
B. Indicators of the development of Financial intermediation
We use three indicators to measure the three aspects of the development of financial intermediation: (i) the ratio of state banking sector's loans outstanding relative to GDP (bank) 6 ; (ii) the ratio of households savings deposits in financial intermediaries relative to GDP (savings), and (iii) the share of fixed asset investment financed by -up (1996) .
To assess the impact of the development of financial intermediation on economic growth, we introduce the financial variables into the traditional growth regression framework. Our analysis consists in estimating the following growth equation:
where Y is the logarithm of real per capita GDP, X is the set of traditional growth determinants (investment, population growth, education and infrastructure), F is the indicators of the development of financial intermediation (bank, savings and loan/budget), η is the unobserved province-specific effect, ε is the error term, and the subscripts i and t represent province and time respectively.
Regarding the set of control variables, we introduce the ratio of fixed asset investment to GDP as a proxy for physical capital (investment), the share of population with at least secondary schooling as a proxy for human capital (education), the density of roads as a proxy for infrastructure (infrastructure) and the annual population growth rate (population growth). All these control variables are assumed weakly exogenous 8 .
Besides, all financial variables-bank, savings, and loan/budget-are assumed to be endogenous, since some theorists argue that the relationship between finance and growth is reciprocal: finance favors growth and growth in turn spurs financial development 9 . Hence we must control for the endogeneity of financial variables to avoid potential biases induced by simultaneity.
7 Due to the data unavailability, Tibet and Hainan are excluded from the sample. 8 The empirical results are similar when these control variables are assumed strictly exogenous.
9 See Greenwood and Smith (1997 
D. Results
Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that, although a twostep estimator is more efficient than a one-step estimator, Monte Carlo studies show that the efficiency gain is small while the asymptotic errors associated with the twostep estimators may be seriously biased downwards. Thus asymptotic inference from one-step standard errors may be more reliable. We therefore report the one-step parameter estimates for GMM-System estimator ( Table 2 and Table 3 ).
In order to identify the global impact of the development of financial intermediation on economic growth, we exclude at first the variable investment from the regression. Table 2 reports the results. In the columns 1, 2 and 3, we introduce respectively the three variables of financial intermediation. As we expect, bank does not enter the growth regression significantly, while the coefficients on the other two financial To separate the productivity effects of financial intermediation from its investment effects, we now introduce the variable investment into the regression. Table 3 shows the results. Investment has a positive and significant coefficient, which supports the theoretical prediction that physical capital formation contributes to economic growth. Bank is still insignificant while the coefficients on savings and loan/budget remain significant and decline only slightly, from 0.061 to 0.051 and from 0.024 to 0.018,
respectively. It appears that the impact of financial intermediation on growth runs through its impact on investment and productivity, but mainly through the latter. With regard to other variables, the results are similar to those of Table 2 , except that education enters two of three regressions significantly (see columns 1 and 3). The human capital spurs growth through its impact on total factor productivity, but may hamper physical capital formation since education demands economic resources and reduces resources available for investments in physical projects. As a result, its global effects are ambiguous as shown in For comparative purposes, we present the results using OLS levels estimator and Within groups estimator in Table 4 and Table 5. In comparison with Table 2 and   Table 3 , the main difference consists in the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. It seems that the OLS levels estimator gives an estimate biased upwards while the Within groups estimator is biased downwards, which conforms with the theoretical arguments of Hsiao (1986) and Nickell (1981) . The GMM-System estimate of this coefficient lies comfortably above the corresponding Within Groups estimate, and below the corresponding OLS levels estimate, which can be regarded as a signal that the GMM-System estimator is probably preferable. Moreover, the use of OLS levels estimator and Within groups estimator makes the variable bank enter the regressions with a negative coefficient, which is significant in seven of eight regressions. In contrast, the GMM-System estimator always gives the variable bank an insignificant coefficient. As we have shown in Section 2, the central government considers financial intermediation as a means to tax rich and dynamic regions and to subsidize poor and stagnant regions, which may lead to an artificially imposed causality from economic development to financial intermediation. It seems that OLS levels estimator and Within groups estimator suffer from the bias induced by the endogeneity of the variable bank, while the GMM-System estimator manages to avoid this bias. Finally, with regard to the other financial intermediation variables, savings and loan/budget always has a positive and strongly significant coefficient. The use of alternative estimators does not change our conclusion concerning the role of financial intermediation in the process of economic growth in China.
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p-values in parentheses, standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity, ** (***) indicates statistical significance at the 5 (1) percent level;
For the regressions including the variables loan/budget, Fujian province is excluded from the sample due to missing data.
IV. Conclusion
Conforming with the findings of most cross-sectional studies, this paper finds that the development of financial intermediation exerts a positive, causal and economically large impact on China's economic growth. This impact runs through two channelsthe substitution of loans for state budget appropriation and the mobilization of households savings-but not through the channel of loan expansion. The failure of several previous case studies about China to identify a significant relationship between financial development and growth may be due to the fact that these cases studies concentrate their attention on only one aspect of financial intermediation development-loan expansion-but ignore other aspects.
Based on our empirical results, we argue that, in China loan distribution is not totally efficient according to commercial criteria, but loans are more efficient than state budgetary appropriation. The fundamental change of the means of resource allocation, from state budget appropriation to bank loans, improves the efficiency of capital use and promotes growth. It appears that due to incentives distorted by the political process, governments performs poorly as a distributor of financial resources. It would be desirable that governments limit their role to that of a regulator and supervisor, and refrain from intervening in the lending decision process of financial intermediaries.
The efficiency improvement of China's financial intermediation has great potential.
Deep reform needs to be implemented for transforming China's financial sector into a more efficient engine of growth. It would be desirable that the four state-owned banks can be transformed into independent commercial banks and all financial intermediaries make their lending decisions based on purely commercial criteria. It's also very crucial to improve the non-state sector's access to bank loans. This requires that the legal system should be strengthened to provide investors strong protection, and non-state enterprise should make corporate governance, beneficial ownership and financial reporting more transparent.
